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I wanted to thank the University of Tulsa College of Law for putting on such a 
wonderful conference on my health law scholarship. I am touched, honored, and appre-
ciative. But I must admit that, when I first got my invitation, I was also more than a little 
bit surprised. I wondered: had there been a mistake? It felt premature. After all, I’m only 
52. I like to think my best work is still ahead of me. But I concluded it was unlikely that 
my inviters meant some other Einer Elhauge. So then I thought: maybe I had some fatal 
illness no one had told me about yet? A friend who heard about the conference actually 
asked me in worried fashion if I was dying or something. No worries, the doctor says I 
am healthy. I have some time left. I just got to enjoy feeling like Tom Sawyer when he 
listened in on his eulogy. In any event, while I hope I have plenty more to accomplish, it 
is nice to know that I have reached the stage of life when I can rest on my laurels if I 
want. 
As I reflect on my work, I realize that my best work really consists of the people 
here. Great scholars like conference participants Glenn Cohen, Abigail Moncrief, Barak 
Richman, Chris Robertson, and Talha Syed have all been either students or fellows of 
mine at Harvard Law School and its Petrie-Flom Center. The goal of any academic is to 
make meaningful contributions, but the real dream is to do work that others build on so 
that the ideas can live and grow. When I see the inventiveness and the importance of 
what my former students and fellows have added to my initial contributions, I feel a 
sense of parental pride in having had some small role in their development. 
Here I offer a few observations on the articles that they published in this symposi-
um and their connections to my work. These observations give me the opportunity to 
ruminate widely on diverse topics ranging from how best to restructure our health care 
system, which efforts to enhance human biology should be regulated, why changes to the 
central organizing principle of medicine are inevitable, and what we should avoid as 
health care reform increasingly encourages the bundling of medical services.  
 
I.	 ﾠCHRIS	 ﾠROBERTSON’S	 ﾠPRESUMPTION	 ﾠAGAINST	 ﾠEXPENSIVE	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
HEALTH	 ﾠCARE	 ﾠCONSUMPTION	 ﾠ
Although I’m not quite dead yet, the truth is that we are all dying, eventually. We 
                                                              
	 ﾠ *	 ﾠ Petrie Professor of Law, Harvard Law School.	 ﾠ
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like to speak of medicine saving lives or curing illness, but all medicine can really do is 
postpone death and delay illness.1 As Daniel Callahan pointed out, while medicine can 
help individuals put off facing the “ragged edge” between life and death, health and ill-
ness, we all will have to face it eventually, and the more successful health care is in 
pushing off death and illness today, the more of us will be at that ragged edge in the fu-
ture, facing health care problems that are generally more difficult to treat because we are 
older and the earlier problems were, by definition, treated.2 We could, moreover, spend 
100 percent of our GDP without running out of interventions that could provide some, 
albeit small, health benefit.3 This and many other reasons have led me to conclude that 
we somehow have to trade off the benefits of health care against its costs, but that there 
was little hope of doing so as long as health care remains governed by an absolutist para-
digm that refuses to do so and instead threatens malpractice liability and professional 
discipline on those who make such tradeoffs and mandates forms of insurance that re-
move the individual incentive to even try.4 
Innovation will not help with this problem because our current system incentivizes 
innovation that provides any marginal health benefit, regardless of the cost, and provides 
no incentive for cost-reducing innovation.5 Nor will better information about technolo-
gies  or  medical  practices  help  because,  in  our  current  system,  accurately  identifying 
which technologies and practices have small health benefits and high costs makes them 
more likely to be used.6 Scientists cannot, in any event, tell us how to trade off benefits 
and costs because those are questions of value that cannot be answered through science.7 
Even if they could, the benefits and costs would vary by patient, practitioner, region, and 
output and constantly change over time as the technology and costs change; no central-
ized regulator could possibly deal with the informational problems.8 
Given these and other considerations, I have concluded that the best solution is to 
create a system where individuals choose among care-allocating plans that each get a 
fixed budget they must spend on health care (based on the number of enrollees they at-
tract and adjusted for enrollee health status) and also a bonus based on how many enrol-
lees they get.9 In such plans, tradeoffs in spending the fixed budget would not be framed 
as morally problematic choices between health against dollars, but rather as whether any 
given amount spent would provide more health benefit if spent on action X or Y.10 Indi-
                                                              
  1.   See Einer Elhauge, Allocating Health Care Morally, 82 CAL. L. REV. 1450, 1460 (1994) [hereinafter 
Elhauge, Allocating Health Care Morally]. 
  2.   Id. (discussing DANIEL CALLAHAN, WHAT KIND OF LIFE: THE LIMITS OF MEDICAL PROGRESS 63-65, 
120, 221-22 (1990)). 
  3.   Elhauge, Allocating Health Care Morally, supra note 1, at 1459. 
  4.   Id. at 1459-65; Einer Elhauge, The Limited Regulatory Potential of Medical Technology Assessment, 82 
VA. L. REV. 1525, 1531-67 (1996) [hereinafter Elhauge, Limited Regulatory Potential]. 
  5.   Elhauge, Allocating Health Care Morally, supra note 1, at 1459-60, 1462-63, 1543; Elhauge, Limited 
Regulatory Potential, supra note 4, at 1526. 
  6.   Elhauge, Limited Regulatory Potential, supra note 4, at 1527, 1585-88. 
  7.   Id. at 1529, 1598-99. 
  8.   Id. at 1530, 1607-15. 
  9.   Elhauge, Allocating Health Care Morally, supra note 1, at 1453-54, 1620; Elhauge, Limited Regulatory 
Potential, supra note 4, at 1620. 
  10.   Elhauge, Allocating Health Care Morally, supra note 1, at 1465; Elhauge, Limited Regulatory Poten-
tial, supra note 4, at 1620. 
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viduals would have incentives to pick the plans that maximize their expected health ben-
efit and that pick the measure of health maximization that best fits their moral values.11 
Plans would have no incentive to spend too much (because their budgets would be fixed) 
or too little (because unlike with current capitated plans they could not keep what they 
did not spend); instead their incentives would be to make decisions that maximize health 
benefits to their patients because that is the best way to attract more enrollees and earn 
more of the bonuses that determine their profits.12 In such a system, we would get the 
maximum health benefit out of whatever amount we decided as a society it was worth 
budgeting to health care, rather than on other things in life that we value. 
In his article, Professor Chris Robertson quite reasonably points out that this is all 
fine and good, but twenty years after I proposed this solution, no one seems to have 
adopted it yet, and in the meantime we need to make decisions about how to muddle 
through using our existing insurance system.13 He proposes that when public or private 
insurers  make  decisions  about  how  best  to  modify  insurance  reimbursements,  they 
should be guided by a generalized presumption against using expensive health care tech-
nologies.14 He offers no less than a dozen persuasive reasons to doubt we have any 
strong reason to believe health care benefits exceed costs for such technologies. The 
dirty dozen includes: (1) new medical technologies have huge costs; (2) FDA approval 
indicates only minimal benefits and no consideration of costs; (3) less than half of medi-
cal care is based on good empirical evidence of effectiveness; (4) publication bias means 
the empirical studies we do have may not be valid; (5) empirical studies are often biased 
by  poor  blinding  or  randomization;  (6)  empirical  studies  are  often  funded  by  self-
interested businesses; (7) drug effectiveness often means only that the drug is effective at 
achieving some result that might not relate to better health; (8) benefits are generally so 
small that only one in five patients is likely to benefit from the intervention; (9) the most 
expensive treatments are generally the newest, about which we know the least; (10) pa-
tients have low incentives to consider costs given insurance and little ability to assess 
benefits; (11) physicians are also largely insulated from costs and have incentives to in-
cur them; and (12) aggregate data shows that the United States spends 20-30 percent 
more than other similar nations without getting any better health results.15 
His points are all excellent, but I would make it a baker’s dozen by stressing a 
point from my earlier work that Robertson also mentions. We have goals in life other 
than health and even to the extent we did not, studies suggest that spending on things like 
education, nutrition, housing, environmental protection, or just distributing cash all tend 
to produce more health benefit than equal spending on health care.16 For example, in my 
town, like many others, health care spending for teachers keeps rising in a way that raises 
                                                              
  11.   Elhauge, Allocating Health Care Morally, supra note 1, at 1524-26; Elhauge, Limited Regulatory Po-
tential, supra note 4, at 1620-21. 
  12.   Elhauge, Limited Regulatory Potential, supra note 4, at 1620, 1622. 
  13.   Christopher T. Robertson, The Presumption Against Expensive Health Care Consumption, 49 TULSA L. 
REV. 627 (2014). 
  14.   Id. at 630. 
  15.   Id. at 635-42. 
  16.   Elhauge, Allocating Health Care Morally, supra note 1, at 1460-61. 
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the school budget, and the way the town copes is to keep cutting the number of teachers. 
(I wonder sometimes whether in the future the whole town will be taught by one teacher, 
who in turn is monitored constantly by a team of hundreds of doctors and nurses.). Stud-
ies like these suggest that the additional health care spending probably provides less 
health benefit to the remaining teachers than the harm to student health that results from 
lowering education, even if we foolishly ignore the non-health value of education in edi-
fying our minds and making us more productive. The cost of health care should not be 
thought of as cold abstract dollars: it consists of all the other things in life we could fund 
with those same dollars that would bring us greater joy and better health. 
The big question is how one would implement such a presumption using an insur-
ance reimbursement policy, and on that Roberston suggests, among other things, that 
such a presumption provides support for two clever proposals to reform health insurance 
design that he has developed at length in other work: (1) scaling patient cost-sharing and 
(2) splitting health benefits. 
1. Scaling Cost-Sharing. Robertson’s proposal to scale cost-sharing would address 
an ugly reality in our current system: insurance plans tend to apply the same deductibles 
and copays and cost-sharing caps to the poor and rich alike. For the poor, this often de-
ters them from pursuing highly beneficial care; for the rich it makes them oblivious to 
cost-benefit tradeoffs; and the combination results in a system that is remarkably regres-
sive. To address this, he suggests scaling cost-sharing so that it is based on a percentage 
of income, rather than using the same flat amounts for people with wildly different in-
comes.17 
As my prior work indicates, I myself doubt that patient cost-sharing will lead to 
sound cost-benefit tradeoffs because patients would still underweigh the costs (given that 
most costs would remain insured) and inherently cannot assess benefits as well as medi-
cal professionals (given that what they are purchasing from those professionals is, after 
all, their superior medical knowledge).18 Indeed, these factors mean that patients will 
generally just rely on the advice that medical professionals give them anyway. I think 
that sound reform has to structure matters so that the relevant decision makers have both 
the knowledge and incentives to make sound tradeoffs.19 That is why I instead favor re-
structuring the system so that medical professionals with the knowledge on health bene-
fits also have the right incentives by giving them a fixed budget to spend on caring for a 
population (adjusted for the population’s health status), with a bonus for the number of 
enrollees they attract. The fixed budget would mean these physicians could not profit by 
providing too much care or too little; their only incentive would be to allocate the fixed 
budget in a way that maximizes health benefits for the population in a way that attracts 
the new enrollees that give them their bonus. Although Robertson is right that we are not 
there yet, there are portions of Obamacare that, with proper regulatory implementation, 
                                                              
  17.   Christopher T. Robertson, Scaling Cost-Sharing to Income: How Employers Can Reduce Healthcare 
Spending And Provide Greater Economic Security, 14 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS (forthcoming 
2014). 
  18.   Elhauge, Allocating Health Care Morally, supra note 1, at 1542; Elhauge, Limited Regulatory Poten-
tial, supra note 4, at 1536-37, 1562-63. 
  19.   Elhauge, Allocating Health Care Morally, supra note 1, at 1542. 
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could lead in that direction.20 
Still, as Robertson points out, we in fact do now rely on consumer cost-sharing, 
and if we are going to do so, then he is certainly right that scaling it would be sensible. 
However,  I  would  offer  a  friendly  amendment.  In  my  experience,  what  cost-sharing 
means in practice is that months after someone in my family received health care, I re-
ceive a set of statements stating that some seemingly random share of the cost has not 
been reimbursed for opaque reasons that make little sense unless you have an unusual 
ability to translate insurance coding into English. For scaled cost-sharing to have any 
beneficial effect on consumption decisions, the cost sharing has to be clear and prospec-
tively disclosed to patients before those consumption decisions are made. Otherwise, it is 
just a meaningless and arbitrary reduction in the financial protection that insurance is 
supposed to provide that comes too late to beneficially impact consumption decisions. 
2. Splitting Benefits. Robertson’s other proposal to modify current insurance de-
sign may be even more clever: cover expensive treatments with a split benefit, under 
which the insurer would pay the patient X percent of the treatment cost in cash and if the 
patient chose to spend that cash to get the treatment, then the insurer would cover the rest 
of the treatment cost.21 That way, the patient gets full financial protection but also has 
incentives to forgo treatments if the patient benefits are less than X percent of the treat-
ment costs. For example, if an expensive treatment costs $100,000, an insurer might give 
a patient 10 percent, or $10,000, and if the patient chooses to spend that money on the 
treatment, the insurer would also cover the remaining $90,000. When patients do not 
think a treatment is worth even 10 percent of its cost, the patients would keep the cash, 
saving the health care system from expenditures that apparently are very inefficient. 
His proposal is quite brilliant, and yet to me it not only raises the issues noted 
above about whether patients have the knowledge and incentives to make sound cost-
benefit tradeoffs, but also harkens back to a fundamental question: why exactly do we 
treat health care as specially deserving of funding even though health care is actually less 
effective at promoting health than other things we could spend the money on, including 
just distributing cash? The answer, I think, is odd but true: we are more motivated to 
fund health care not because it provides greater benefits, but because funding health care 
results in less harm to productive incentives.22 The ordinary motive to redistribute money 
is restrained by the fear that if we redistribute too much, it might diminish the incentives 
of recipients to work. But when we redistribute in the form of funding health care, this 
restraint melts away. After all, people do not want to be sick, and have little interest in 
consuming health care unless they are sick. And sick people have a hard time working 
anyway. So we can fund health care spending without much fear that it will diminish 
work incentives. 
If we provide a split benefit, we will be giving people cash for being sick, cash that 
they can use on things they value when they are not sick. This will give them incentives 
                                                              
  20.   Einer Elhauge, Obamacare and the Theory of the Firm, in THE FUTURE OF HEALTH CARE REFORM 
(Anup Malani & Michael H. Schill eds., forthcoming 2014) [hereinafter Elhauge, Obamacare]. 
  21.   See Christopher T. Robertson, The Split Benefit: The Painless Way to Put Skin Back in the Health Care 
Game, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 921 (2013). 
  22.   See Elhauge, Allocating Health Care Morally, supra note 1, at 1486-93. 
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to fake or exaggerate their illnesses. Moreover, even when they are sick, we will be giv-
ing them cash for seeking medical authorization for outlandishly expensive treatments 
that they then turn down. People who now might not even consider the unproven expen-
sive treatment will have powerful incentives to consider it in depth to get the cash bene-
fit. As Robertson correctly points out, the net effect all turns empirically on how many 
such people there are compared to the number of persons whom the split benefit would 
cause to decline excessively costly health care that they would otherwise have obtained. 
But I fear the dynamic effects would multiple the former as they learn about this new 
way to generate cash. I fear also that such a system might undermine a foundational ra-
tionale for treating health care as special in the first place. 
 
II.	 ﾠGLENN	 ﾠCOHEN	 ﾠON	 ﾠHUMAN	 ﾠENHANCEMENT	 ﾠ
One of the many reasons I’m glad that I’m not quite dead yet is that I still need to 
finish a book that I have labored on for many years about efforts to re-engineer human 
biology to enhance our attributes. This unpublished book on human enhancement is the 
topic of the article by my wonderful colleague Professor Glenn Cohen, a man so amaz-
ingly productive that he is now writing pieces about my work before I can even finish it. 
My main solace is that, after reading Cohen’s cataloging of the maze of issues that my 
book covers, I think you can understand the complexities that explain why it has been 
taking me a while to synthesize my analysis of those issues into a coherent narrative and 
unified theory. My other solace is that future human enhancements might allow me to 
insert the Cohen fast-writing gene into my genome. 
Cohen ably summarizes a great many of the analytical distinctions I address and 
debunk in my book, including not only the fundamental distinction between treatment 
and enhancement, but also distinctions based on whether enhancements are biological or 
non-biological, genetic or non-genetic, reversible or irreversible, and for self or others.23 
However, Cohen is less categorical in his rejection of some of these distinctions and 
sympathetic to others. Cohen also captures well my point that our regulatory strategies 
include not just legal sanctions, but also taxes and moral sanctions.24 Cohen further co-
vers many of the justifications that my book addresses and rejects, such as claims that 
enhancements  threaten  safety,  equality,  solidarity,  diversity,  earning  our  accomplish-
ments, savoring random talent distribution, the parent-child relationship, and the right to 
an open future.25 However, Cohen is less categorical than me in his rejection of some of 
these justifications and sympathetic to others, and his grounds for skepticism about cer-
tain justifications are somewhat different from mine. 
Finally, in an important original contribution, Cohen relies on Derek Parfit’s non-
identity problem to argue that enhancements often replace one potential child with an-
other in a way that means the enhancement can neither be said to harm or benefit the 
                                                              
  23.   I. Glenn Cohen, What (If Anything) Is Wrong With Human Enhancement? What (If Anything) Is Right 
With It?, 49 TULSA L. REV. 645, Part I (2014). 
  24.   Id. at Part II. 
  25.   Id. at Part III. 
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parent’s children.26 I cannot deny the force of this argument, but I am not yet persuaded 
by it. To draw an analogy, suppose a parent gives a child a terrible education and home 
environment; not one involving abuse, but one that leaves the child poorly equipped to 
succeed in the world. I think it is no defense for the parent to say to the child, “Yes, I 
gave you a terrible upbringing, but you are better off than if I had done even less, so I did 
not affirmatively harm you, and you would not have the psychological identity you have 
now without the terrible upbringing I gave you.” I do not think the persuasive reason for 
condemning this parental conduct is that the child started with a psychological identity 
that the upbringing did not change but could be said to harm. To the contrary, the change 
to psychological identity is likely strong, and the harm compared to a past baseline is du-
bious. I think the reason for condemnation is instead that as parents we owe a duty to 
raise our children the best that we can, even though the choices we make inevitably do 
alter who our children are. The right baseline is thus how our children would be if we did 
our best, not if we did nothing, even though the difference between doing our best and 
nothing does alter the psychological identity of our children.  
Likewise, if in some future world, parents could order up whatever genes they 
want their children to have, wouldn’t they have a duty to equip their children with the 
best genes they could? In such a world, I do not think it would be a defense for a parent 
to say, “Yes, I did a terrible job picking your genes, but you are better off than if I had 
not created you at all, so I did not really harm you, and you would not have the genetic 
identity you have now without the terrible genes I gave you.” In other words, I think a 
world where pre-birth enhancements can manipulate the genes our children carry prob-
lematizes the baseline notions about the relation between identity and genetic makeup 
that drive Cohen’s non-identity argument. But I have not yet fully worked through this 
complicated problem, which is part of what is delaying my project. 
Obviously, I cannot summarize a book’s worth of analysis here. So let me focus on 
just two things: (1) clarifying the fundamental distinction about absolute and transfer 
benefits, the one distinction I think does make normative sense; and (2) exploring an im-
portant theme of my book that Cohen does not cover but that I think has profound impli-
cations for the future organization of health care. 
1. Clarifying Absolute v. Transfer Benefits. As Cohen notes, my book concludes 
that the fundamental distinction that does make sense is based on the extent to which in-
terventions have absolute benefits versus transferred benefits and costs.27 Absolute bene-
fits are gains from human re-engineering that would be enjoyed even if others obtained 
the same biological improvement. In contrast, transferred benefits are gains from human 
reengineering that reflect transfers of value from others, and thus result in no value for 
anyone if everyone engages in reengineering with the same effects. Shifted costs are 
harms from human engineering that are inflicted on others, whereas unshifted costs are 
costs  from  re-engineering  that  the  user  suffers  personally.  Usually,  the  best  test  of 
whether this standard is met is to ask whether the persons being re-engineered would still 
do so without any transferred benefits or ability to shift costs. If so, then the absolute 
                                                              
  26.   Id. at III.a, IIIg.ii, IV. 
  27.   Id. at 665. 
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benefits exceed the costs of undergoing the intervention, and thus the intervention should 
be allowed. My book not only argues that this test makes the most sense on consequen-
tialist grounds, but also observes (in a discussion Cohen echoes) that it conforms to the 
Kantian categorical imperative that one should act in such a way that one would want 
everyone to act.28 
Although Cohen is right that my theory is related to the objection that many human 
enhancements raise a problem of “positional goods,”29 my theory differs from that objec-
tion in four ways.  
First, the analysis in my book is more general in that it also includes certain other 
cases where costs are shifted to others.  
Second, the term “positional goods” has several ambiguities that my framework 
avoids. Sometimes the term is used to refer to value derived from goods that turns only 
on how the good ranks one person versus another. Under this view, if the value I get 
from building an addition to my house comes only from the fact that now my home is 
bigger than my neighbor’s—I experience no value from the added space itself—then that 
is a positional good. But I want to extend this concept to cover situations where there is a 
real experienced benefit that is transferred: such as when the act causes my neighbor’s 
house to be transferred to me. Further, the term “positional good” is generally ambiguous 
about just how much of a good’s value must be positional for it to count as a positional 
good. Some use the term to mean goods whose only value is positional, others to mean 
goods that have any positional value, and others to mean goods whose main value is po-
sitional. My book clarifies that none of those abstract definitions are appropriate because 
what matters instead is whether the person would incur the costs of obtaining the good 
without whatever portion of value was positional/transferred. Although that test would 
always be met if all of the value were positional, that test might or might not also be met 
in cases where some or most of the value is positional/transferred, depending on whether 
the rest of the value exceeds the costs of the intervention. This approach allows my theo-
ry to explain a far wider range of limits on human re-engineering, and it also provides a 
clearer theory of how to draw the line between the prohibited and permitted categories. 
For example, at the conference Professor Arti Rai asked the insightful question: 
isn’t intelligence a positional good? It is a good question because being more intelligent 
certainly provides one with advantages over others, and yet intelligence is generally not 
what people mean by a positional good that merits prohibition. To the contrary, enhanc-
ing intelligence is generally regarded as the human enhancement that is most justifiable. 
Our whole educational system seeks to pursue this goal. The key to answering this ques-
tion is that whether an intervention merits prohibition does not turn on whether some or 
most of the benefits are positional; it turns on whether a decisive portion of the benefits 
are merely transferred from others. Education certainly provides positional gains, but it 
also provides important absolute benefits even if everyone gets it. We do (and should) 
find it desirable because those absolute benefits exceed the costs, even if we ignore the 
positional gains. 
                                                              
  28.   Id. at 651. 
  29.   Id. at 676. 
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Third, prior scholars have generally listed positional goods as merely one in a long 
list of arguments against human enhancements, as Cohen does. In contrast, my argument 
is that the problem of transferred benefits and shifted costs is the only objection that real-
ly justifies any regulatory limit on efforts to improve human biology. 
Fourth, precisely because my theory expands upon the positional good argument 
and shows why this expanded version is the exclusive persuasive objection, my book 
shows that this justification fits the actual pattern of which interventions we allow and 
condemn. My book explains, for example: (1) why the performance-enhancing use of 
beta-blockers is prohibited for Olympic archers, but allowed for classical musicians; (2) 
why the performance-enhancing use of ADHD drugs is condemned when used to boost 
SAT scores, but allowed for military pilots; (3) why some forms of plastic surgery are 
viewed benignly, while others are socially sanctioned; and (4) why selecting the sex of 
children is deemed morally permissible in the United States, but not in India or China. 
As  this  discussion  should  clarify,  although  Cohen  treats  this  transferred  bene-
fit/externality problem as distinct from what he calls the problem of coerced voluntary 
enhancement,30 the latter is actually a subset of the former. When Cohen describes the 
cases of coerced voluntary enhancements that he finds objectionable, he asks us to “im-
agine a good that is distributed in a zero-sum way, be it money, a job, a meaningful ro-
mantic relationship, etc.”31 But if the good is zero-sum, that means that 100 percent of 
the benefit from obtaining the good is transferred. By definition, in such a case, there is 
no absolute benefit, and thus the absolute benefits could not exceed any costs from the 
intervention. 
Indeed, one of the core cases that my book discusses is why we properly condemn 
using ADHD drugs temporarily to boost SAT scores. Such temporary usage does not re-
sult in any long term improvement in intelligence or knowledge. Rather, temporarily us-
ing ADHD drugs during SATs provides only a transferred benefit because the benefits to 
the person who successfully uses them to increase her scores—getting into a better col-
lege—come at the expense of someone else who does not get into that same college. The 
benefits from usage thus consist purely of a transfer of value to the user from others. As-
suming those transferred benefits exceed the personal costs in terms of money and side 
effects, one would expect widespread use of ADHD drugs during the SATs absent any 
legal, social or moral sanction. But then everyone’s SATs scores will be inflated by tak-
ing ADHD drugs, and there will be no reason to think that the relative scores among ap-
plicants will change significantly. If so, who gets into which college will be largely unaf-
fected. No one will gain an improvement in college placement. But everyone will suffer 
whatever costs and side-effects are caused by temporary use of ADHD drugs. 
As my book stresses, because of the underlying collective action problem, people 
can  feel  coerced  to  engage  in  the  biological  intervention  even  when  they  otherwise 
would not.  Suppose,  for  example,  that  some  persons  feel  morally  opposed  to  taking 
ADHD drugs to improve their SAT scores. If others are taking ADHD drugs and improv-
ing their SAT scores accordingly, the persons who decline to do so will effectively suffer 
                                                              
  30.   Id. at 658-59. 
  31.   Id. at 659. 
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an SAT penalty for their choice. The same will be true for any biological intervention 
that creates purely transferred benefits that exceed personal costs: those transferred bene-
fits will cause some to engage in the activity and create a coercive penalty that tends to 
induce others to do the same. 
But as my book also explains, while such a collective action problem simplifies the 
analysis, because it indicates the activity makes everyone worse off on balance, condem-
nation does not depend on the collective action problem materializing. Suppose, for ex-
ample, that in practice only half the SAT test takers will have the money or connections 
to get ADHD drugs. That half of test takers may enjoy personal benefits that exceed their 
costs, and thus they would not be worse off, and others would not be successfully co-
erced into taking ADHD drugs. Nonetheless, it remains the case that there is no net bene-
fit because the college placement that the drug-users gain is just transferred from some-
one else, and there is a net cost. Indeed, here the net cost includes not only the personal 
cost in money or side-effects to the student taking ADHD drugs, but also the externalized 
cost of distorting the college admission process. Because the concentration benefits of 
temporary use will not continue long term, admitted students will be less qualified than 
colleges would prefer. 
In contrast, the United States has openly encouraged mentally-fatigued military pi-
lots to take Dexedrine, an ADHD drug that the military calls a “go-pill,” even though, as 
Cohen notes, one could say that such usage also involves coerced voluntary enhance-
ment.32 As my book explains, the lack of condemnation for this practice makes sense be-
cause such pilot usage is not dominated by transferred benefits, at least not within the 
United States. Instead, the believed benefits involve a reduction in plane crashes and 
mental errors that are desirable for both the pilots and others, and do not come at the ex-
pense of other pilots. 
Indeed, consistent with the importance of transferred benefits, the main ethical ob-
jection to go-pills has come from foreign nations that do not allow their own pilots to use 
go-pills and that regard usage by the U.S. military as unethical. Part of the explanation 
may be that using go-pills gives the U.S. military a tactical advantage over the air forces 
of other nations. Thus, while a pilot’s individual use may not give them a transferred 
benefit relative to other pilots or U.S. citizens, the U.S. military’s use may have a trans-
ferred benefit relative to other nations. However, given that more military crashes result 
from mental fatigue than from enemy fire, it seems likely that (even ignoring the trans-
ferred benefits) the absolute benefits would suffice to justify usage by U.S. military pi-
lots given the great health risks of pilot error compared to the lesser health risks from the 
drug. 
Finally, Cohen suggests that to the extent human enhancements involve externali-
ties like transferred benefits or costs, a natural solution might be a Pigouvian tax to get 
persons to internalize the externality.33 That seems sensible in theory, and is certainly 
consistent with my theory, which treats legal penalties and taxes, along with social and 
moral sanctions, as simply alternative regulatory strategies. In practice, however, I think 
                                                              
  32.   Id.  
  33.   Id. at 666-67. 
10
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 49, Iss. 3 [2014], Art. 2
http://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol49/iss3/2	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
2014]	 ﾠ I’M	 ﾠNOT	 ﾠQUITE	 ﾠDEAD	 ﾠYET	 ﾠ 617	 ﾠ
we would find it very difficult to quantify the tax that equals the transferred benefit from, 
say, using Ritalin while taking SATs. Nor is it the case that we always use taxes rather 
than prohibitions to regulate externalities, especially when they can lead to collective ac-
tion problems; for example, we tend to prohibit littering or exceeding fishing limits with 
penalties that are designed to deter the activity rather than to price it. As my book stress-
es, and Cohen notes, in a world where no regulation is perfectly accurate, choices among 
such regulatory strategies turn on whatever choice best minimizes the total harm from 
over-deterring desirable conduct and under-deterring harmful conduct.34 
2. The Coming Death of the Medical Treatment Limit. Although I’m not quite 
dead yet, I think conventional limits on what medicine means soon will be. Current 
health care law and professional ethics are organized around the principle that medicine 
should be limited to the treatment of disease and disability. This principle thus draws a 
distinction between such permissible treatments and impermissible efforts to enhance 
health beyond the cure of disease and disability. As Cohen indicates, I do not think this 
treatment-enhancement distinction makes much normative sense.35 But the point in my 
book goes even further: I think this distinction is inherently unsustainable. Thus, even 
those who normatively favor the treatment-enhancement distinction are going to need a 
new theory of how to set regulatory limits, and medical regulation will have to get a new 
central organizing principle. 
The best explanation for the medical treatment limit is that it tracks a sensible risk-
benefit calculation. As put by distinguished Harvard philosopher Norman Daniels, if we 
are trying to cure a disease or disability, the benefits are large enough to offset the medi-
cal risks, but “if we are trying to improve on an otherwise normal trait, the risks of a bad 
outcome, even if small, outweigh the acceptable outcome of normality.”36 At first blush, 
this seems like a sensible prudential rule, but to really understand its implications, we 
need to understand what concretely distinguishes being normal from having a disease or 
disability. 
A disease or disability is typically defined, in work that Daniels himself helped pi-
oneer, as: “Any state of a person’s biology or psychology which reduces species-typical 
normal functioning below some statistically defined level.”37 In short, a disease or disa-
bility is something that puts our functioning in a sufficiently low percentile to bring our 
functioning below the normal statistical range. Just what determines that percentile de-
pends on judgments about the importance of the characteristic for functioning in society. 
For intelligence, having an IQ in the bottom 2.5 percent (below 70) is defined as a disa-
bility,38 whereas for height it is the bottom 1.2 percent, which the FDA ruled was when 
human growth hormone was approved to correct short stature that did not have an under-
                                                              
  34.   Id. at 673-74. 
  35.   Id. at 655-56. 
  36.   Norman Daniels, Can Anyone Really Be Talking About Ethically Modifying Human Nature?, in HUMAN 
ENHANCEMENT 25, 38 (Julian Savulescu & Nick Bostrom eds., 2010). 
  37.   Julian Savulescu et al., Well-Being and Enhancement, in ENHANCING HUMAN CAPACITIES 3 (Julian 
Savulescu et al., eds., 2011).  
  38.   Id. 
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stood cause.39 Thus, the prudential judgment of the medical treatment limit is that if your 
characteristic is below a certain percentile in human functioning, then the benefits of ad-
dressing the problem are worth the risk of biological intervention, but if above that per-
centile, the risks exceed the benefits. 
However, there is no real reason to think that the risk-reward tradeoff for every bi-
ological intervention magically gives us a line that happens to equal the bottom of the 
normal range for the condition of interest. It all depends on the particular risks and bene-
fits of the specific intervention. There may be many characteristics above the bottom of a 
normal statistical range that are worth correcting because the benefits are large relative to 
the risks. True, one could account for this issue by simply raising the percentile threshold 
until it matched the relevant risk-benefit tradeoff. We seem to have already done so for 
interventions to correct eyesight, allowing such interventions when eyesight is below 
20/20, even though only 35 percent of adults have 20/20 vision without correction.40 Al-
lowing such interventions thus effectively defines the bottom 65 percentiles as “below 
normal.” But once we take this step, it seems clear that the line has less to do with any 
statistical assessment of normality than with a sensible judgment that the risks of eye-
sight correction are relatively low compared to the benefits for everyone in the first 65 
percentiles. If the normality line simply tracks such risk-benefit tradeoffs, then the medi-
cal treatment limit becomes meaningless, amounting to nothing more than an admonish-
ment to act only when the benefits exceed the risks, which presumably anyone consider-
ing an enhancement would want to do without any regulatory limit. 
The line provided by the medical treatment limit becomes even fuzzier when the 
disease or disability is defined in terms of conditions rather than percentiles. Consider 
the use of Ritalin and other drugs to treat attention deficit disorders. The American Psy-
chiatric Association stated in its 2000 diagnostic manual that 3-7 percent of school-aged 
children have attention deficit disorders, which is a relatively high percentage given or-
dinary standards of normality. The percentage of children aged six to seventeen diag-
nosed with attention deficit rose from 6 percent to 8 percent from 1997 to 2006, reaching 
10 percent for children aged twelve to seventeen, and 12 percent for all boys aged six to 
seventeen.41 From 2003-2007, the percentage of children aged four to seventeen who had 
ever been diagnosed with an attention deficit disorder rose from 7.8 percent to 9.5 per-
cent, with the rate reaching 13.2 percent for boys.42 The diagnosis of attention deficit 
disorders has also been increasing in many other nations. 
Similar issues have been raised about the use of Prozac or other antidepressants to 
treat depression and other mental disorders. From 1996 to 2005, the percentage of non-
institutionalized U.S. persons aged six or older who were on an antidepressant prescrip-
tion rose from almost 6 percent to over 10 percent, meaning 27,000,000 Americans were 
                                                              
  39.   Marc Kaufman, FDA Approves Wider Use of Growth Hormone, WASH. POST, July 26, 2003, at A12. 
  40.   Maxwell J. Mehlman & Jessica W. Berg, Human Subjects Protections in Biomedical Enhancement Re-
search: Assessing Risk and Benefit and Obtaining Informed Consent, 36 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 546 (2008). 
  41.   Diagnosed  Attention  Deficit  Hyperactivity  Disorder  and  Learning  Disability:  United  States,  2004–
2006, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL, http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/series/sr_10/Sr10_237.pdf. 
  42.   Increasing Prevalence of Parent-Reported Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder Among Children—
United States, 2003 and 2007,  Morbidity  and  Mortality  Weekly  Report, CTRS.  FOR DISEASE CONTROL & 
PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm5944a3.htm?s_cid=mm5944a3_w. 
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receiving antidepressants by 2005.43 The 2005 rate was 12 percent for whites, 13 percent 
for women, 17 percent for those who were divorced or widowed, and 22 percent for the 
unemployed. The number of total antidepressant prescriptions increased by 17 percent 
from 2005 to 2009, while the U.S. population increased by 5 percent; so the 2005 per-
centages are probably all about 12 percent higher today.44 Elsewhere in the world, there 
has been a similar explosion in the prescription of antidepressants. 
Many complain that this high and increased rate of diagnosing depression and at-
tention deficit disorders reflects an unfortunate cultural tendency to over-medicalize or-
dinary human life. But perhaps the underlying cause is that the medical treatment limit 
requires calling something a disease or disability in order to get the medical intervention. 
After all, the rapid increase in diagnosis of depression and attention deficit disorders has 
occurred across varied cultures and coincides with the advent of drugs that could in-
crease happiness or mental concentration. Perhaps the underlying phenomenon is thus 
that these drugs are believed to provide mood or cognitive benefits that exceed the health 
risks for a substantial segment of the population, and doctors are willing to slowly adjust 
notions of disease or disability in order to be able to prescribe these drugs to patients 
who would receive net benefits from them. If so, the problem of over-medicalization 
may be less cultural than legal: that the law requires diagnosing patients with a disease or 
disability in order to give them a drug that makes them better off. In the short run, this 
law may have the unfortunate effect of requiring physicians to misdescribe medical con-
ditions and patients to feel bad or stigmatized for having a disease or disability. In the 
long run, it suggests that the medical treatment limit has a hard time holding in the face 
of perceptions that a broader range of persons can benefit from a medical intervention. 
Already, for example, research suggesting that interventions might slow or eliminate the 
aging process has led some to proclaim that aging itself is a disease. 
Perhaps the treatment limit at least provides a crude rule that generally indicates 
when the benefits of biological intervention are likely to outweigh the health risks, even 
though that general presumption might be rebutted for particular interventions. But even 
at this crude level, such a tradeoff is necessarily dependent on the particular technologi-
cal circumstances that determine the rewards and risks. Even if the crude tradeoff justi-
fied a medical treatment limit in the past, there is no reason to think it does so now or 
will continue to do so in the future. As the science advances, a new set of biological in-
terventions will likely arise that inflicts less risk, or confers greater benefits on those in 
the normal range, which ultimately will change the crude risk-reward tradeoff. 
My book thus concludes, in a discussion that Cohen echoes, that in the future we 
will look back on medicine having had three ages. The First Age of Medicine, which 
ended only in the early 1900s, was when medicine was so poorly developed that it was 
on average more likely to harm than help. The Second Age, the century from the early 
1900s to early 2000s, was when scientific advances meant medicine could help more 
                                                              
  43.   Mark Olfson et al., National Patterns in Antidepressant Medication Treatment, 66 ARCHIVES OF GEN. 
PSYCHIATRY 848 (2009). 
  44.   Top  Therapeutic  Classes  by  Dispensed  Prescriptions  (U.S.),  IMS  HEALTH,  available  at 
http://www.imshealth.com/deployedfiles/imshealth/Global/Content/Corporate/Press%20Room/2012_U.S/Top_
Therapeutic_Classes_Dispensed_Prescriptions_2012.pdf (updated May 2013).  
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than hurt, but generally only if it were confined (via the treatment limit) to cases where 
people suffered such egregious problems that there were very large benefits to set against 
the risks. In the coming century, we are likely to reach the Third Age, when medical pro-
gress will reach the point that medicine can often confer benefits on persons without any 
disease or disability that are large enough to offset the health risk. We are currently in the 
transition from the second to third of the Three Ages of Medicine, which at some point 
will result in the breakdown of the treatment-enhancement line and the open use of med-
ical interventions to enhance normal attributes. 
Indeed, there are a few areas where that is arguably already the case. Although ac-
ne is medically called a disease, that characterization seems strained for a condition that 
affects almost all children during puberty, and culturally no one feels it is necessary to 
conclude that their pimples have reached a state of disease or disability in order to justify 
a trip to the dermatologist. Likewise, while various forms of plastic surgery were origi-
nally  developed  in  order  to  treat  injuries  or  diseases,  today  they  are  widely  used  to 
achieve cosmetic benefits without legal prohibition. The plastic surgeon and patient may 
be more likely to go ahead with a nose job if it can also fix a deviated septum, but many 
are perfectly willing to go ahead if the nose is simply larger than desired. Here, even 
when the benefits are only cosmetic, the risks are low enough that we seem to have no 
problem allowing biological interventions without requiring a real disease or disability. 
If we are willing to lift the medical treatment limit to achieve cosmetic benefits when the 
risks are low, it seems unlikely we would be unwilling to lift that limit if low risk meth-
ods arise to increase mental ability or other desirable attributes. 
But the problem goes deeper. Even if, despite these changing risk-benefit tradeoffs, 
we could hold the line on treating only the bottom percentiles, the medical treatment lim-
it would fail to provide any long run constraint on biological interventions. After all, if 
we keep allowing any biological intervention that eliminates conditions that are in the 
bottom 1-2 percent of the then-current range, we will keep moving people out of that 
bottom 1-2 percent, which will just create a new set of people in the bottom 1-2 percent 
to treat. Once we treat them, there will be another new set of people to treat, and so on. 
In the fictional land of Lake Wobegon, it might be possible for everyone to be above av-
erage, but in the real world that is not possible. Likewise, we cannot live in a fantasy 
land where no one is in the bottom percentiles. The medical treatment limit will thus be 
an inevitable victim of medical progress, which will keep chipping away at the bottom 
percentiles and shifting the distribution of attributes higher and higher. In the long run, 
then, full success in medical treatment converges on allowing all biological enhance-
ments. 
Thus, the medical treatment limit cannot set any meaningful long-term constraint 
on efforts to remold human biology; it can only slow them down. If there is something 
truly wrong with some of those efforts, the medical treatment limit fails to stop them 
from eventually becoming pervasive. If there isn’t anything truly wrong with those ef-
forts, then there is no good reason to slow down their adoption. 
Another reason the medical treatment limit is ultimately unsustainable is that sci-
entific developments are likely to increasingly result in treatments that are also enhanc-
ing, which will further blur the enhancement-treatment line. This is already the case to 
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some extent. Lasik surgery may leave a nearsighted person with 20-15 vision. A nose job 
to fix a deviated septum may leave a big-nosed person with a nose more lovely than av-
erage. Beta-blockers themselves can be both treatment and enhancement when they are 
used by a shooter or musician with heart problems. Thus, even if otherwise effective, a 
medical treatment limit might merely funnel enhancement research into treatments that 
also enhance. 
Treatment-enhancement overlaps are likely to be increasingly raised by better in-
terventions, especially mechanical interventions. While biological treatments typically 
cannot leave the patient any better off than somewhere in the normal range, mechanical 
interventions have the potential to fix a disease or disability while leaving the patient 
more able than anyone that normal range. If disability-corrected persons are more able 
than normal persons, it seems unlikely we would deny the same correction to normal 
persons, especially because efforts to do so raise the strong possibility that people might 
deliberately disable themselves to get the enhancement. 
Part of what makes the medical treatment limit unsustainable is that it assumes a 
status quo baseline (the normal range), without any persuasive explanation for why we 
should deem the status quo to be so desirable that it should prevent us from enjoying im-
provements above that baseline. Such a status quo baseline is, after all, historically con-
tingent. People used to have much worse teeth, so that in the Medieval Age someone 
with cavities might well have been regarded as within the normal range, given how many 
rotten  teeth  others  had.  No  sensible  person  thinks  that  this  means  dental  care  today 
should not treat cavities. Nor do I detect much yearning for the old status quo of shorter 
lives and heights, so I doubt we could sustain objections to a future of longer lives and 
taller heights. 
Another problem with trying to sustain the medical treatment limit is that it draws 
many dubious distinctions because it defines the status quo baseline at such a low level. 
For example, given the definition of disability, the medical treatment limit would mean 
that an intelligence-enhancing drug that improved someone’s IQ from 69 to 70 would be 
permissible because an IQ of 69 is below the normal range and thus qualifies as a disa-
bility. Indeed, the government would be obligated to fund use of that drug in any system 
that offers universal health care. However, using an intelligence-enhancing drug to im-
prove an IQ from 70 to 100 would be affirmatively prohibited under the medical treat-
ment limit, even if the health risk is low and the person pays for the drug himself, be-
cause the person started within the normal range of intelligence. It is hard to see what 
would justify that sort of distinction. 
An even bigger difficulty with sustaining the medical treatment limit is that it is 
deeply ambiguous because it provides no theory to explain which set of persons we 
should use to define the relevant normal range. To begin with, should the normal range 
be based on the set of persons with one’s own sex or ethnicity? Consider the FDA rule 
that approves the use of human growth hormone only for children who are in the bottom 
1.2 percent of height.45 This rule actually defines a separate bottom 1.2 percent for boys 
                                                              
  45.   Without FDA approval a drug cannot be sold at all, and drug manufacturers cannot market a drug for 
any unapproved uses. Although the FDA does not prohibit physicians from prescribing FDA-approved drugs 
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and girls—boys are eligible if without the hormone they would be shorter than 5’3”, girls 
if they would be below 4’11”. Thus, the fact that a girl would grow to 5’0” means she is 
denied access to a medicine even though the same predicted height would entitle a boy to 
it. This embraces an implicit normative claim favoring a height differential between men 
and women. The controversial nature of this normative claim can be seen by asking: 
would we do the same for different ethnic groups? Suppose it is the case that the bottom 
1.2 percent is 5’1” for Latino men.46 Would we say Latino men who would grow to 5’2” 
should be denied growth hormone, while non-Latino men who would grow to that height 
get it? It is hard to imagine the FDA would engage in such discrimination against Lati-
nos, but such a distinction is hard to distinguish from the discrimination that the FDA 
mandates against women. If instead we do not allow such discrimination, but rather draw 
the same height line across all sexes and ethnicities, then it will be the case that a higher 
proportion of women and Latinos will be eligible for human growth hormone than men 
and non-Latinos. One might then argue that the line discriminates against men and non-
Latinos.  
If we allowed distinctions based on ethnicity, then the logic would seem to require 
further problematic line drawing based on nationality. Suppose, for example, we drew 
the Latino/non-Latino distinction described above. Would I be able to argue that, be-
cause I am of Argentinian descent and Argentinians are taller than the average Latino, 
the height line for my children should be higher? If so, then someone of Scandinavian 
descent should also be able to argue that, because they are taller than the average white 
person, they should get a higher height line. Actually, because I am one-fourth Danish, I 
could argue both. 
Quite  apart  from  distinctions  based  on  nationality,  a  status  quo  baseline  raises 
troubling questions about which nations to look to at all. The FDA defined its standard 
using the U.S. baseline, making the standard higher than it would be if the FDA had in-
stead used a world baseline. But if a U.S. and foreign person would grow to the same 
short height, what is normatively attractive about saying the U.S. person should be free 
to use a human growth hormone denied to the foreigner? It is not clear whether we 
should define the baseline in terms of the average in the world, in one’s own nation, in 
nations like one’s own, or in developed nations. 
One could raise similar problems based on family distinctions. For example, sup-
pose Joe says that, although he is above the bottom 1 percent of U.S. males in height, he 
comes from a very tall family and is within the bottom 1 percent of his family, which 
makes him feel bad. Under a status quo baseline, he would seem free to argue that his 
normatively relevant status quo is his family, not his general ethnicity group. But if we 
did that, we would discriminate against persons who came from generally shorter fami-
lies.  
                                                                                                                                                           
for other uses, doctors are less likely to do so without marketing, and in any event, medical ethics are common-
ly understood to make it improper to prescribe drugs or do procedures unless they treat a disease or disability, 
so that doctors generally follow the same definition as the FDA. 
  46.   The fifth percentile for Latino men is 5'3" compared to 5'6" for Whites and 5'5" for Blacks, according to 
Halls.MD,  Health  Calculators  and  Charts,  Height  and  Weight  Charts,  available  at 
http://www.halls.md/index.htm. 
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It is not even clear why any status quo baseline should be judged in terms of such 
inborn traits or national residence at all. For example, in the NBA being below 5’10” 
would put you in the bottom 1 percent of players even though it is the average height for 
U.S. men.47 Suppose Sam is 5’9” and in the NBA. Should he be able to argue that he 
should get access to human growth hormone because he is in the bottom 1 percent of 
NBA players? After all, in terms of his life chances, this may be a far more relevant 
group than national or ethnic averages. This sort of logic suggests all of us should be able 
to define the groups that we regard as normatively relevant when establishing our status 
quo situation, but then any rule breaks down. 
The underlying problem in all the above cases is the same. The lines are hard to 
sustain because the medical treatment limit provides no real theory defining what it is 
about the status quo that should be regarded as so normatively attractive that it mandates 
prohibiting change. If we had such an underlying theory, we could advert to it directly 
rather than relying on the status quo. To the extent we instead rely on a status quo that is 
defined independently of any normative theory, then there will be many possible ways of 
deciding which set of persons constitutes the relevant status quo, and we will not have a 
sufficient normative theory for determining which set is the right one to use. 
III.	 ﾠBARAK	 ﾠRICHMAN	 ﾠON	 ﾠTYING	 ﾠHISTORY	 ﾠ
Although I’m not quite dead yet, the single monopoly profit theory is. That single 
monopoly profit theory had for decades has been used to push back against antitrust lia-
bility for tying sales of one product to another. In prior work, I declared the death of this 
theory, showing that it depended on five assumptions that did not always hold, and that 
each relaxation of one of those assumptions meant that a different type of anticompeti-
tive effect was possible.48 This is the prior work of mine that Professor Barak Richman 
addresses in his contribution.49 
While my approach was largely theoretical, Richman takes a historical approach. 
He finds that antitrust suits that forced IBM to unbundle various products and services 
opened up new markets for computer programming and software in a way that unleashed 
innovation and enormous economic benefits.50 His history fits well with the economic 
theories of harm stressed in my prior work but extends somewhat further and adds some 
interesting implications.
51 
The economic theory of harm that is most directly connected to the history Rich-
man develops is that firms may use ties to foreclose competition in a tied market (here 
programming and software) less for its own sake than in order to preserve the degree of 
                                                              
  47.   Two  NBA  players  were  less  than  5"10"  in  2004-05.  See 2004-ﾭ‐05	 ﾠ NBA	 ﾠ Player	 ﾠ Survey	 ﾠ Results,	 ﾠ
NBA.com,	 ﾠhttp://www.nba.com/news/survey_height_2004.html#bottom. Since each of thirty teams had twelve 
players, than means they were in the bottom two out of 360. 
  48.   Einer Elhauge, Tying, Bundling Discounts, and the Death of the Single Monopoly Profit Theory, 123 
HARV. L. REV. 397, 403-20 (2009) [hereinafter Elhauge, Tying]. 
  49.   Barak D. Richman & Steven W. Usselman, Elhauge on Tying: Vindicated by History, 49 TULSA L. 
REV. 689 (2014).  
	 ﾠ 50.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ Id.	 ﾠat	 ﾠ694-ﾭ‐95.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ 51.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ Id.	 ﾠ
17
Elhauge: I'm Not Quite Dead Yet -- and Other Health Care Observations
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 2014	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
624	 ﾠ TULSA	 ﾠLAW	 ﾠREVIEW	 ﾠ [Vol.	 ﾠ49:607	 ﾠ
market power they enjoy over the tying product (here hardware).52 As Richman notes, 
although IBM did not seem to foresee how massive the software market might become, 
IBM when bundling did hold the view that the point of controlling the software was to 
sell its hardware. If other firms also provided software, then entry by rivals into the 
hardware markets would be much easier because buyers could combine hardware from 
those rivals with software from other IBM rivals. Stopping IBM’s bundling would thus 
lower entry barriers to hardware in a way that would lessen IBM’s future market power 
over that hardware, which is in fact what happened. Today, the PC market is highly 
competitive, which would not have been the case if IBM had continued to control soft-
ware in a way that would have given buyers no software to run on non-IBM machines. 
Richman’s history also implicates the other economic theories of harm that I cov-
ered as well. As Richman’s history reveals, part of IBM’s motivation for bundling hard-
ware with programming services and software was to extract more money out of its 
hardware. This relates squarely to the various theories I establish for how tying can be 
used to increase monopoly profits even if it does not alter the degree of market power in 
either the tying or tied products.53 For example, IBM’s tying of machines to overpriced 
punch cards could facilitate profit-increasing price discrimination because the rate of us-
ing cards correlated with how much buyers were likely to value the machines. Tying ma-
chines to programming services could achieve similar intra-product price discrimination 
to the extent that the usage of services correlated with buyer valuation of the machines, 
but  also could accomplish inter-product price discrimination if buyer valuations of ma-
chines and services were not too positively correlated or could extract individual con-
sumer surplus if purchasers buy multiple machines. Under all these theories, the motiva-
tion for the bundling does not turn on hobbling competitors in the tied markets: the 
bundling could be profitable for IBM even if IBM’s tied market power remained unal-
tered. These theories thus fit well with Richman’s observation that preventing competi-
tion in programming services and software did not seem to be central to IBM’s motiva-
tion. 
What Richman’s IBM case study powerfully shows is that, even if a firm’s motive 
for tying is to preserve tying market power or extract more consumer surplus from it, ra-
ther than to suppress competition in the tied market for its own sake, tying can in fact 
suppress competition in that tied market in a way that creates large harms to innovation 
and social welfare. The fact that a firm like IBM may not intend or even foresee such 
harms is little solace to society and provides no sound grounds to ignore such effects. 
This relates to two points I have made, though I think also extends beyond them. 
The first point is that when explaining why ties that increase monopoly profits can 
decrease total welfare even if they do not increase the defendant’s degree of market 
power in either market, my prior work assumed (to be conservative) that none of the ad-
ditional profits would be dissipated. In fact, however, those additional profits will at least 
partially be dissipated by many factors, including most relevant here that implementing 
ties is actually costly. It requires sellers to incur expenditures to monitor compliance or 
                                                              
	 ﾠ 52.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ Elhauge,	 ﾠTying,	 ﾠsupra	 ﾠnote	 ﾠ48,	 ﾠat	 ﾠ417-ﾭ‐19.	 ﾠ
  53.   Id. at 404-13. 
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design products to prevent noncompliance, and it often causes buyers to spend resources 
to avoid ties or to suffer the costs of inferior technologies designed to prevent such 
avoidance strategies.54 These implementation costs will dissipate some of the increased 
profits from tying and thus make it even more likely that tying harms total welfare. The 
fact that the increased profits from tying might outweigh such implementation costs ex-
plains why IBM would have been motivated to prevent the unbundling of its machines 
from programming services and software even if unbundling offered a more efficient 
product design. It also supports the view, suggested by Richman, that without antitrust 
enforcement, it was not inevitable that efficient unbundling of those markets would have 
occurred. 
The second point relates to the charge by some that preventing firms from using 
ties to extract the entire total surplus from their tying market power will deter them from 
creating the innovation that gave them that tying market power in the first place.55 As I 
have explained in prior work, this charge misses the point that economics actually shows 
that innovation is optimized when innovators get a certain fraction of the total surplus 
created by their innovation, rather than all of it.56 The reason is that we want to maximize 
the difference between the value of innovation and the cost of creating it, and if one gives 
innovators all of total surplus, then they will expend increasing costs on creating innova-
tions until they dissipate the entire total surplus. Thus, we will get the optimal investment 
in innovation if antitrust law allows firms to get only ordinary monopoly profits from 
their tying market power, rather than allowing firms to use ties to extract all of total sur-
plus. This point explains why the Supreme Court has rejected the argument that a firm 
with tying market power should be able to tie in order to prevent entrants into the tied 
market from free-riding on its investment in creating the tying product.57 This point also 
explains why antitrust authorities were right to reject the IBM argument that it should be 
allowed to tie in order to prevent others from free-riding on its innovation. 
But Richman’s showing extends beyond these points because it shows that another 
important innovation-harming effect of tying is that it can prevent follow-on innovation 
in the tied market, whether or not that was the aim of the tying firm. This is not a harm 
that my prior work has considered. Its addition is an important contribution to the tying 
literature that seems consistent with recent literature on patent economics that shows that 
one of the most important harms from excessive patent protection is that it can produce a 
net reduction in innovation by precluding subsequent innovations by others.58 
                                                              
  54.   See Warren S. Grimes & Lawrence A. Sullivan, Illinois Tool Works, Inc. v. Independent Ink, Inc.: Re-
quirements Tie-Ins and Intellectual Property, 13 SW. J.L. & TRADE AM. 335, 350-51 (2007); Barry Nalebuff, 
Price Discrimination and Welfare, 5 COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L 221, 232 (2009). 
  55.   Dennis W. Carlton & Ken Heyer, Extraction v. Extension: The Basis for Formulating Antitrust Policy 
Towards Single-Firm Conduct, 4 COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L 285 (2008). 
  56.   Elhauge, Tying, supra note 48, at 439-42. 
  57.   Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 461, 484-85 (1992) (noting that Ko-
dak argued that its tie was justified “to prevent ISO's [independent service organizations, the tied markets ri-
vals] from free-riding on Kodak's investment in the copier and micrographic industry” and rejecting this argu-
ment because “[t]his understanding of free-riding has no support in our case law.”). 
58.   For a theoretical model proving that this is possible, see generally Michele Boldrin & David K. Levine, 
A Model of Discovery, 99 AM. ECON. REV. 337 (2009). For empirical work showing that expanding patent pro-
tections have had net negative effects on patent filings and suppressed later innovations, see generally Josh 
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You may wonder what any of this tying analysis has to do with health care. After 
all, my prior work on tying and bundling extended to any industry, and Richman’s article 
is about the computer industry. But tying and bundling are rife in the health care indus-
try, and new forms of it are likely to increasingly raise issues in health care because 
Obamacare encourages not only using bundled payments to try to create some cost-
reducing  incentives,  but  also  creating  Accountable  Care  Organizations  that  combine 
what used to be different market functions into one quasi-integrated provider.59 Rich-
man’s article is an important reminder that, as we pursue such bundled strategies in 
health care reform, we have to be careful to prevent bundling that amounts to anticom-
petitive ties, as he has stressed in other work.60 
 
                                                                                                                                                           
Lerner, The Empirical Impact of Intellectual Property Rights on Innovation: Puzzles and Clues, 99 AM. ECON. 
REV. 343 (2009); Fiona Murray et al., Of Mice and Academics: Examining the Effect of Openness on Innova-
tion, Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 14819 (2009); Heidi L. Williams, Intellectual Prop-
erty Rights and Innovation: Evidence from the Human Genome, Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Pa-
per No. 16213 (2010). 
  59.   Elhauge, Obamacare, supra note 20. 
  60.   See Barak D. Richman, Concentration in Health Care Markets: Chronic Problems and Better Solu-
tions,  AMER.  ENTERPRISE  INST.  (June  13,  2012),  available  at  http://www.aei.org/files/2012/06/12/-
concentration-in-health-care-markets-chronic-problems-and-better-solutions_171350288300.pdf.  
20
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 49, Iss. 3 [2014], Art. 2
http://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol49/iss3/2